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Abstract
Achieving widespread population immunity by voluntary vaccination poses a major challenge for public health
administration and practice. The situation is complicated even more by imperfect vaccines. How the vaccine efficacy affects
individuals’ vaccination behavior has yet to be fully answered. To address this issue, we combine a simple yet effective game
theoretic model of vaccination behavior with an epidemiological process. Our analysis shows that, in a population of self-
interested individuals, there exists an overshooting of vaccine uptake levels as the effectiveness of vaccination increases.
Moreover, when the basic reproductive number, R0, exceeds a certain threshold, all individuals opt for vaccination for an
intermediate region of vaccine efficacy. We further show that increasing effectiveness of vaccination always increases the
number of effectively vaccinated individuals and therefore attenuates the epidemic strain. The results suggest that ‘number
is traded for efficiency’: although increases in vaccination effectiveness lead to uptake drops due to free-riding effects, the
impact of the epidemic can be better mitigated.
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Introduction
Preemptive vaccinationis the principle strategy for theintervention
and control of infectious diseases. However, vaccination represents a
long-standing social dilemma for public health administration. On
the one hand, compulsory vaccination may result in an infringement
of civil rights [1]. On the other hand, voluntary vaccination cannot
lead to sufficiently high herd immunity for disease eradication. Thus
it often fails to protect populations from epidemics [2,3,4,5].
Traditional epidemiological modeling focuses on the pathway of
disease transmission, and often does not take into account human
strategic behavior in response to the epidemic [6]. However, it is
more plausible to integrate human behavior with the epidemio-
logical process. In this sense, voluntary vaccination itself is a social
dilemma: vaccinated individuals can escape from the disease with
a cost partly incurred by the vaccine side effects; the unvaccinated
can also be protected from the epidemics without paying anything
provided the population immunity is in effect. In this case, self-
interested individuals attempt to shun vaccination while still
benefitting from the herd immunity. Such free-riding may lead to
a low vaccination level, failing to eradicate the disease, thus a
social dilemma [7,8]. The framework of game theory properly
describes how individuals react when facing a dilemma
[9,10,11,12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19]. In particular, how the evolu-
tionary outcome of the social dilemma is achieved can be
investigated based on the imitation process [20,21]. Therefore,
voluntary vaccination can be studied in this framework and
noteworthy there has been an emerging literature of combining
epidemiology and game theory [7,22,23,24,5,25,8,26].
Previous work usually assumes perfect vaccination, i.e., the
vaccinated individuals gain perfect immunity against the disease
[7,23,8]. The effectiveness of vaccination, however, is not 100%,
such as measles [27], malaria [28] and HIV [29]. Even though the
actual vaccination is perfect, the perceived effectiveness can be
not. Questionnaire results have shown the perceived effectiveness
is often lower than the actual one [24]. This perceived efficacy of
vaccination, influenced by psychological effects, plays a determi-
nant role since individuals adjust their strategic behavior based on
perceptions of the vaccine efficacy rather than the actual one
[5,24]. Therefore, imperfect vaccination should be taken into
account in the game theoretical analysis of the vaccination
behavior [30,31,32]. Besides, public concern towards the effec-
tiveness of vaccine is so common that it often leads to massive
vaccine avoidance. How vaccine effectiveness affects vaccination
level and thus the severity of epidemic outbreak has not yet been
fully answered. Motivated by these, we study this problem by a
minimal model.
Analysis
For proof of principle, we consider vaccination dynamics in an
infinitely large well mixed population. In addition, we assume that
individuals have a perfect knowledge on the effectiveness of the
vaccination. In this case, there is only one parameter describing
both the actual and the perceived effectiveness.
The vaccination game consists of two stages, the yearly
vaccination campaign and an epidemic season. During the
vaccination campaign, each individual decides whether or not to
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 1 June 2011 | Volume 6 | Issue 6 | e20577take vaccination. A vaccinated individual pays a cost Vw0 while
an unvaccinated individual pays nothing. This cost V includes the
time spent in taking the vaccination as well as its side effects.
During the epidemic season, the population can be divided into
two parts: one comprises effectively vaccinated individuals, and the
rest is composed of unvaccinated individuals and the vaccinated
ones whose vaccinations are not effective. Successfully vaccinated
individuals are immune to the seasonal disease, and thus have no
risk of getting infected. For the remaining individuals, however,
they become infected with a probability f(y), where y is the
frequency of effectively vaccinated individuals. In this case the
infected bear a cost by Cw0. This cost C includes expenses and
time for health care as well as mortality. The larger the number of
effectively vaccinated individuals is, the less likely an unvaccinated
individual gets infected. Thus f(y) is decreasing with y.
Let the effectiveness of the vaccination be e and the vaccine
uptake level be x. The frequency of the effectively vaccinated
individuals is y~ex. The fraction of the vaccinated and healthy
individuals is xe z(1{e)(1{f(ex)) ½  , which is composed of two
parts: these effectively vaccinated individuals (with frequency xe)
and those ineffectively vaccinated individuals (with frequency
x(1{e)) who are free from the infection (with frequency
1{f(ex)). In this case, each effectively vaccinated individual gets
payoff {V. In analogy to this, the frequencies and payoffs for
different individuals are given by Table 1.
When the epidemic season ends, i.e., the average abundance of
infected individuals does not change, individuals adjust their
strategies by imitation where successful individual’s strategy is
more likely to be followed [33,34]. Here we employ the Fermi
update rule to characterize such an imitation process
[35,36,8,37,38]: two individuals a and b are selected randomly;
a learns to behave like b with probability
1
1zexp {k(fb{fa) ½ 
ð1Þ
where fa and fb are the perceived payoffs for a and b, and k is
the selection intensity indicating how strongly individuals are
responsive to payoff difference.
The dynamics of the vaccination is governed by [20,39]
_ x x~x(1{x)½ ez(1{e)1 {f(ex) ðÞ ðÞ (1{f(ex))tanh(
k
2
({V))
z ez(1{e)(1{f(ex)) ðÞ f(ex)tanh(
k
2
({VzC))
z(1{e)f(ex)(1{f(ex))tanh(
k
2
({V{C))
z(1{e)f 2(ex)tanh(
k
2
({V)) 
ð2Þ
It has been suggested that the selection intensity for human
imitation is rather weak [21,34], i.e. k is sufficiently small. We
perform the Taylor expansion of the r.h.s of Eq. (2) in the vicinity
of k~0, then after a time rescaling which does not change the
dynamics, Eq. (2) can be captured by a much more simple form
_ x x~x(1{x)(ef(ex)C{V) ð3Þ
In what follows, we investigate how the vaccine uptake evolves
by Eq. (3) for general function of infection risk f. To this end, we
focus on how the effectiveness of vaccination has an impact on the
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PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 2 June 2011 | Volume 6 | Issue 6 | e20577the collective outcome of vaccination behavior and the effective
vaccination level. Then we incorporate an epidemic dynamics to
obtain a specific infection function. Based on this, we provide
precise predictions for the two problems. Besides we also study
how the effectiveness affects the final epidemic size in this case.
General infection function
For a general function of infection risk f(y), when ef(ex)C{
Vv0 is valid for all x lying between zero and one, no one would
take vaccination in the long run, i.e. x ~0 is the unique stable
equilibrium for Eq. (3). Since f(y) is a decreasing function,
ef(0)C{Vv0 is sufficient to ensure ef(ex)C{Vv0. In analogy
to this, when ef(e)C{Vw0 is valid, the entire population ends up
with full vaccination, i.e. x ~1 is the unique stable equilib-
rium. For e fulfilling ef(0)C{Vw0 and ef(e)C{Vv0, by the
monotonicity of ef(y)C{V in y, there is a unique internal
equilibrium,
x ~
f {1(
V
eC
)
e
: ð4Þ
Further, ef(y){(V=C) is decreasing, the derivative at x ,
namely ef’(x ), is negative. Thus x  is stable, indicating the
coexistence of the vaccinated and the unvaccinated. To show how
x  is affected by e requires the exact form of the function of
infection risk. We will address it later.
The effective level of vaccination reads
y ~ex 
~f {1(
V
eC
): ð5Þ
By Eq. (5), y  is an increasing function of the effectiveness, e.I n
other words, the effectively vaccinated level always increases with
vaccine efficacy. This result only requires that f(y) decreases with
y. This is true for most, if not all, known infection functions
[22,23]. Therefore our predictions are robust with respect to
variations in specific infection functions.
A specific infection function
In order to give precise predictions, we adopt a simple
Susceptible-Infected-Recovered (SIR) model with demographical
effects as presented in [7]. In this model, the population is divided
into three different compartments: susceptible, who are healthy
but can catch the disease if exposed to infected individuals;
Infective, who are infected and can pass the disease on to others;
Recovered, who are recovered from the infection and gain
immunity against the disease. The time evolution of the population
states is governed by the following equations
dS
dt
~m(1{y){bSI{mS, ð6Þ
dI
dt
~bSI{cI{mI, ð7Þ
dR
dt
~myzcI{mR, ð8Þ
where m is the birth rate and equal to the mortality rate (for
simplicity, we only consider constant population size), b is the
transmission rate, c is the recovery rate, and y is the fraction of
effectively vaccinated individuals among newborns.
From Eq. (7), we derive the basic reproduction ratio R0:i f
R0~b=(czm)ƒ1, the time derivative of I is negative, suggesting
that the disease cannot persist in the population. The equilibrium
state of the population consists of (S ,I ,R ), with S ~1=R0,
I ~m R0(1{y){1 ½  =b and R ~1{S {I . By setting I ~0,
we obtain the herd immunity needed to eradicate the disease,
yh~1{1=R0.
Based on this stationary equilibrium, we calculate the pro-
bability that an unvaccinated individual gets infected in her life
time. The waiting time to acquire infection follows an exponential
distributions with rate bI , and so does the waiting time to death
but with rate m. Since infection and death are two independent
processes, the probability that infection occurs before death event
is the relative ratio of intensities, bI =(bI zm). This probability
gives the infection risk of an unvaccinated individual, namely,
f(y)~1{1= R0(1{y) ½  which is a function of the population level
of effective vaccine uptake y and holds for 0ƒyvyh. When
yhƒyv1, f(y)~0, i.e. the disease will be eradicated provided the
effective level of vaccination exceeds the critical point yh. Thus we
have
f(y)~
1{
1
R0 1{y ðÞ
if 0ƒyv1 {
1
R0
0 y§1 {
1
R0
0
B B @ : ð9Þ
Taking this specific infection function Eq. (9) into Eq. (3), we
present the full dynamics analysis of the evolution of vaccination
behavior in the long run (see Fig. 1). Let the ratio of the
vaccination cost versus the infection cost V=C be rv1. We have
(For details, see Text S1)
Case 1: when R0ƒ
1
1{r
, all are unvaccinated for e [ (0,1).
Case 2: when
1
1{r
vR0ƒ(
1
1{
ﬃﬃ
r
p )
2;i feƒ
r
1{
1
R0
, all are
unvaccinated, otherwise there is a unique internal stable
equilibrium x .
Case 3: when R0w(
1
1{
ﬃﬃ
r
p )
2;i feƒ
r
1{
1
R0
, all are unvacci-
nated, if
r
1{
1
R0
veƒe 
1, there is a unique internal stable
equilibrium x ,i fe 
1veƒe 
2, all are vaccinated, if e 
2ve, there is
a unique internal stable equilibrium x .
Where x ~
1{
1
R0(1{
r
e
)
e
, e 
1,2~
1zr
2
{
1
2R0
+
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
R2
0(1{r)
2{2R0(1zr)z1
q
2R0
.
Imperfect Voluntary Vaccination
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 3 June 2011 | Volume 6 | Issue 6 | e20577Case 1 indicates that for a mild epidemic, 1vR0ƒ
1
1{r
,
vaccination behavior is impossible for any vaccination effective-
ness. For a more serious epidemic, Case 2 shows, however, there
is an overshooting of vaccine uptake: the coexistence of the
vaccinated and the unvaccinated emerges as the effectiveness
exceeds a threshold. Furthermore, interestingly, the increase in
effectiveness does not always promote the vaccination behavior
(see the upper panel of Fig. 2). Intuitively, for the vaccinated,
increasing the vaccination effectiveness does reduce the infection
probability. For the unvaccinated, however, this leads to that they
are protected by a even more effective herd immunity. Thus
increasing the effectiveness of vaccination is beneficial both to the
vaccinated and to the unvaccinated. The two strategies compete
with each other and the more beneficial one is more likely to
spread through imitation. The result shows, when the effective-
ness is below the critical value, the more beneficial one is the
vaccinated. When it exceeds the critical value, the more
beneficial one is the unvaccinated. Mathematically, the non-
monotonicity of x  on e is induced from the non-monotonicity of
f {1 V
eC
  
=e as discussed above. For an even more serious
epidemic, Case 3, the dynamics of the vaccination behavior is
qualitatively identical to that of Case 2. However, in contrast with
Case 2, full vaccination can be reached (see the upper panel
of Fig. 3).
Besides the vaccination behavior, by taking Eq. (9) into Eq. (5),
the effective vaccination frequency, y ~ex  is given by
y (e)~
1{
1
R0(1{
r
e
)
if 0ƒ
r
e
v1{
1
R0
0
r
e
§1{
1
R0
0
B B B @
: ð10Þ
Hence, the effective vaccination frequency increases as the
effectiveness increases as predicted (See the lower panels of Figs. 2
and 3).
Further, it is of interest to investigate how the final epidemic size
is influenced by the effectiveness of the vaccination. The final
epidemic size I  here refers to the average fraction of the infected
individuals at the end of the epidemics. For the SIR model with
vital dynamics discussed above, when the vaccine uptake reaches a
stationary level x , the final epidemics size of the population is
given by
I (e)~
mr
b(e{r)
if 0ƒ
r
e
v1{
1
R0
m(R0{1)
b
r
e
§1{
1
R0
0
B B @ : ð11Þ
Therefore, I  is a decreasing function with e. That is to say, the
more effective the vaccination is, the smaller proportion is infected
Figure 1. The vaccination behavior on the basic reproductive ratio R0 and the effectiveness e. Here r~0:1, where r~V=C. See main text
for details.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0020577.g001
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PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 4 June 2011 | Volume 6 | Issue 6 | e20577Figure 2. Fractions of the vaccinated and the effective vaccinated for a disease with a moderate infectiveness. The upper panel shows
the stationary frequency of the vaccinated with respective to the effectiveness. No one takes vaccination until it is sufficiently efficient, ew0:45. Then
the vaccine uptake level increases with the effectiveness. When the effectiveness exceeds a threshold, e~0:65, however, the vaccination level
decreases with the effectiveness. The lower panel shows the stationary abundance of the effectively vaccinated individuals with respect to the
effectiveness. It is shown the efficient vaccinated individual increases with the effectiveness all the time. Thus the behavior of vaccination and the
impact of the vaccination against epidemic are not in agreement: for high effectiveness, even though vaccination rate is decreasing, the number of
effectively vaccinated individual increases as the effectiveness e increases. Here R0~3, r~0:3 satisfying
1
1{r
vR0ƒ(
1
1{
ﬃﬃ
r
p )
2.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0020577.g002
Figure 3. Fractions of the vaccinated and the effective vaccinated for a serious disease. The upper panel shows the stationary frequency
of the vaccinated with respective to the effectiveness. Compared to Fig. (2), the whole population could take vaccination provided the effectiveness
is moderate, 0:5vev0:6. The lower panel indicates the stationary abundance of the effectively vaccinated individuals with respect to the
effectiveness. Compared with Fig. (2), the frequency of the effective vaccinated individual also increases with the effectiveness, but it is higher than
that of Fig. (2). Here R0~5, r~0:3 satisfying R0w(
1
1{
ﬃﬃ
r
p )
2.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0020577.g003
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measles (see Fig. 4).
Discussion
Voluntary vaccination is the principle strategy to control
epidemic outbreaks. Vaccination itself, however, is a social
dilemma [8]. Evolutionary game theory, which describes the
evolution of strategies in self-interested individuals, is a powerful
mathematical framework to study such social dilemmas. Most
previous works employing this framework are based on the
assumption of perfect vaccination, where epidemics can be
eradicated from the vaccinated. The vaccination, however, cannot
be so effective [27,28,29]. Therefore it is of interest to ask how the
effectiveness of the vaccination has an impact on the vaccination.
To this end, we combine the SIR model with the imitation
dynamics. For the spreading of disease, we find that increasing the
effectiveness of vaccination always inhibits the prevalence of
epidemics. Therefore imperfect vaccine aggravates the long-
standing dilemma of voluntary vaccination. Thus to control the
epidemics, i.e. to enhance the vaccination effectiveness, there are
two ways: one is to improve technology in vaccine: increasing the
actual effectiveness of the vaccination. The other is to make use of
media: enhancing the perceived effectiveness.
For the vaccination behavior, we find that when the epidemic is
sufficiently serious, all the self-interested individuals may take
vaccination for an intermediate vaccine efficacy. In other words,
increasing effectiveness inhibits the prevalence of the epidemic
with a declining vaccination level. For example when e is larger
than 0:7 in Fig. 2 and larger than 0:6 in Fig. 3. This suggests even
though the vaccination level decreases with effectiveness some-
time, the epidemic is still better controlled than before, thus it is
not necessary to be panic. Besides, all the above results are robust
to general imitation processes [34].
Here we study the simplest possible case, i.e., well-mixed
populations, for proof of principle. A natural extension of the
present analysis is to take population structure into account. For
instance, we can consider spatial structure, which restricts the
neighborhood of individuals whom one can infect or imitate. In
doing so, however, the evolutionary dynamics of vaccination
behavior become more complex and require separate, in-depth
studies. In essence, the vaccination game is similar to the well-
studied snowdrift game [40]. Therefore, spatial structure acts as a
‘‘double-edged sword’’ [8]. In particular, spatial structure
promotes vaccination behavior for small vaccination costs, and
thus we expect that the critical efficacy of vaccination above which
vaccination behavior persists should be smaller compared to the
well-mixed case. These extensions are promising areas for future
research.
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